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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, the Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked tort
common law to interpret federal discrimination statutes.1 During this same
time period, the Supreme Court increasingly invoked textualism as the
appropriate methodology for interpreting these statutes. 2 One immediate effect
of these two trends-tortification and textualisn-is to restrict discrimination
law by tightening causal standards.3
This Article explores how interpreting discrimination statutes through the
lenses of tort law and textualism can expand, rather than restrict,
discrimination law. It assumes that courts will continue to characterize
discrimination statutes as torts and as deriving from the common law, despite
strong arguments to the contrary.4 It then shows how using tort law and
textualism should clarify the roles of intent and causation in discrimination
analysis, alter the way courts conceive intent, lower the harm threshold for
some cases, and alter current conceptions of textualism.
While these changes would radically change current discrimination law,
they do not require the courts to engage in radical statutory interpretation.
They only require the courts to take the combined influences of textualism ad
tortification seriously. This Article shows how each of these changes can occur
if courts simply continue with the interpretive framework set forth in recent
Supreme Court cases. This framework assumes that when Congress used a
word in the discrimination statutes, it intended those words to have a common
Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. I would
like to thank the
Symposium participants and my colleagues at the University of Cincinnati College of Law,
who provided comments and critiques of earlier versions of this Article.
1See infra Part II.
2See infra Part II.
3 See infra Part II.
4I explore why the discrimination statutes are unlike tort law in other works. Sandra
*

F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REv. 1051 (2014) [hereinafter Sperino, Tort Label];
Sandra F. Sperino, DiscriminationStatutes, the Common Law and Proximate Cause, 2013
U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 2.
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law tort meaning, unless otherwise indicated.5 Thus, a court need only look at
words in the discrimination statutes and then look to common law meanings to
define those words. Likewise, the absence of tort words would mean that
Congress did not intend to invoke a particular tort concept.
Applying this interpretive frame results in -several important doctrinal
shifts in discrimination law. If tort law is the baseline for understanding
discrimination law, then discrimination statutes are not intentional torts. None
of the major federal discrimination statutes use the word "intent" or "intend"
in its primary operative language. And, recent Supreme Court cases have
confirmed that the "because of' language in the discrimination statutes refers
to causation. 6 Causation is a different concept than intent. While scholars have
long argued that plaintiffs should not be required to prove intent to establish
disparate treatment claims, the interpretive frame of tortification plus
textualism lends further support for this argument.
The move to tort law also helps plaintiffs who want to proceed under a
more traditional, intent-based framework. Although the primary provisions of
the discrimination statutes do not use intent language, courts often use an
intent-based analysis in individual disparate treatment cases. If the courts
interpret the discrimination statutes to contain an implied intent standard, they
should look to the common law to define intent. If they do, the discrimination
intent standard should be a much less onerous standard than the one courts
currently use in the discrimination context. Further, using common law ideas
of intent opens the possibility that plaintiffs could use the doctrine of
transferred intent to establish liability.
If discrimination is a tort, then substantive harassment law is miscalibrated
in the context of physical contact or threatened physical contact. Under current
doctrine, a supervisor can touch or threaten to touch a worker in inappropriate
ways and the worker may lose her harassment case because the conduct was
not severe or pervasive enough to constitute harassment.7 Using tort law, the
plaintiff should be able to recover once she has established that she was
subjected to unwelcome touching or imminent, threatened touching because of
her protected trait. This move would align discrimination law with tort law,
which recognizes one inappropriate touching or threatened touching is enough
to result in liability. 8 Importantly, tortification and textualism should lead
courts to recalibrate and lower the harm threshold in discrimination cases.
Tortification also poses a threat to modem statutory interpretation. When
the Supreme Court declares discrimination to be a tort that derives from the
common law, the Court is also undermining the idea that the meaning of
statutory words is fixed at the time of a statute's enactment. The common law
56 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011).
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525-26 (2013); Gross v.
FBL Fin. Servs.. Inc.. 557 U.S. 167. 176 (2009).
7Sandoval v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., Inc., 578 F.3d 787, 801 (8th Cir. 2009)
the severe and pervasive standard).
(discussing
8
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§§ 18, 21 (1965).
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of torts is both a set of substantive choices and a methodology. This
methodology allows tort law to change both subtly and dramatically over time,
and is a key feature of what it means for something to be a tort and to derive
from the common law. Tortifying discrimination law means that the
discrimination statutes should at least respond to underlying changes in tort
law. It also opens the possibility that discrimination law retains the flexibility
to respond to changing circumstances, such as new understandings about the
way discrimination is perpetuated.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the move to infuse
discrimination statutes with a tort backdrop and meaning, as well as the move
to textualism. Part III demonstrates how the combined influences of
tortification and textualism mean that discrimination claims do not require a
plaintiff to establish intent. Part IV argues that to the extent plaintiffs want to
rely on intent-based frameworks, tort law intent is less onerous than the intent
standard used in discrimination cases. Part V discusses how harassment
doctrine should be recalibrated to reflect tort law and shows how tortification
and textualism can be used to argue against current harm thresholds. Part VI
explores how the tortification of discrimination law presents a major challenge
to modem conceptions of statutory interpretation.
II. THE MOVE TO TORT LAW AND TEXTUALISM
This section discusses how Supreme Court cases over the past few decades
embraced tort law as a substantive framework for discrimination law and
textualism as an interpretive methodology.
Since 2009, the Supreme Court has rapidly infused discrimination law
with tort concepts. This section provides a brief overview of the recent
tortification trend. It explores this trend through case law interpreting two
major federal discrimination statutes: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 9
Title VII, which is considered to be the cornerstone federal discrimination
statute, provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or

9
Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (2012); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2012). The arguments

made in this Article are applicable to the ADA context as well. Americans with Disabilities

Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012). The ADA is not a primary focus of this discussion
because the Supreme Court cases center on Title VII and the ADEA. I will not make
arguments about cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012).
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(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. 10
Although not identical, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act has
similarly broad operative language." Both Title VII and the ADEA contain
inexact operative language that, in some instances, only vaguely describes the
conduct prohibited under the statutes. Congress did not originally describe
what kind of causation is required to establish a violation of these statutes. It
did not use the word "intent" in the main provisions and did not define
whether discrimination had to be intentional to violate the statutes.
In the 1970s and for most of the 1980s, the Supreme Court rarely invoked
tort law to interpret these statutes. Over the last three decades, the Supreme
Court has explicitly applied tort law to discrimination cases, especially cases
involving intent and causation. The use of tort law in discrimination cases has
become more robust and automatic in the past decade.
A watershed moment for the tortification of discrimination law occurred in
1989. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court considered whether
a plaintiff could prevail on a Title VII claim if the evidence established that
legitimate and discriminatory reasons both played a role in the employer's
refusal to promote her.12 In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
proclaimed that Title VII is a "statutory employment tort." 13
In Price Waterhouse, the plurality opinion ultimately rejected tort
principles. A plurality of four justices described the statutory problem before
it, not through the lens of tort law, but rather as a broader question about the
nature of causation.14 The issue was not what tort law required, but about what
kind of.conduct violates Title VII. The plurality recognized that this question
required the Court to consider how Title VII balanced the interests of
employees and employers.15 It rejected the idea that causation meant that the
plaintiff is required to establish "but-for" cause.1 6 The plurality reasoned that
"to construe the words 'because of as colloquial shorthand for 'but-for
causation,' . . . is to misunderstand them."17 The plurality held that to prevail
on a discrimination claim, the plaintiff must establish that a protected trait is a
motivating factor in a decision.18
1042 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012).
1129
12
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 232 (1989) (plurality opinion).
13Id. at 264 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
14Id at 237 (plurality opinion).
15
1d at 239.
16
Id at 240.
17
Id
18 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244.
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In 1991, Congress responded to Price Waterhouse and other decisions by
amending Title VII.19 Importantly, the amendments do not mimic tort common
law. For example, one change made by the 1991 amendments was to clarify
through statutory language that a plaintiff can prevail on a Title VII claim if
she shows a protected trait was a motivating factor in an employment decision.
Under the amendment, a plaintiff may prevail on a Title VII discrimination
claim if she establishes a protected trait was a motivating factor for a decision,
and the employer may establish a limited defense to damages only if it shows
it would have made the same decision absent a protected trait.2 0 The
substantive standards used in the amendment and the limited defense to
damages are not directly drawn from the common law.
Nonetheless, the move to tort law gained momentum in 2009. In Gross v.
FBL FinancialServices, the Court held that the ADEA required a showing of
but-for causation. 2 1 The Court rejected the idea that the ADEA should use the
same causal standard as Title' VII. 22 After rejecting the Title VII causal
standard, the Justices were faced with a choice: what should the ADEA's
causal standard be? For the majority opinion, the answer was short and simple.
The words "because of' mean "but-for" cause. 23 In support of this proposition,
Justice Thomas cited two cases outside the employment discrimination context
and a torts treatise. 24
The Gross decision is notably different than O'Connor's concurrence in
Price Waterhouse. It is strongly textual and purports to rely on the plain
meaning of the words "because of."25 The opinion stated that the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving but-for cause because this is the typical way
burdens are allocated in litigation. 26 If Congress wanted to upset this typical
allocation, it was required to explicitly do so. 27
The Supreme Court also invoked common law tort principles in Staub v.
Proctor Hospital, in which the Court interpreted the Uniformed Services

19

Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012).
Congress also amended Title VII's disparate impact provisions and these
amendments do not mimic tort law. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
21 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
22
1d. at 174.
23
20 Civil
1d

1d. at 176.

24 1d

at 176-77 (citing Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 653-54

(2008); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63-64, & n.14 (2007); W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 265 (5th ed. 1984)).
25
1d. at 176.
261d at 177.
27
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009). This statement is strange
given that Price Waterhouse allocated burdens differently without an express statutory
provision and that tort law also allows for burdens to be allocated differently in some
scenarios. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 246 (1989) (plurality opinion). The
Gross majority noted that Price Waterhouse would be decided differently if it arose in
2009. Gross, 557 U.S. at 178-79.
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Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). 28 Staub used two
common law ideas: intent and proximate cause. 29 The Court's short analysis
began with the statement: "[W]e start from the premise that when Congress
creates a federal tort it adopts the background of general tort law." 30 Although
Staub considered an interpretive question under USERRA, lower courts have
applied this reasoning in the Title VII context because the Supreme Court
emphasized the similarities between USERRA and Title VII in the Staub
decision.3 '
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the Court

determined whether a plaintiff proceeding on a retaliation claim under Title
VII is required to establish but-for cause. 3 2 As with Gross, the opinion
partially relied on the complex relationship between past Supreme Court
precedents and the 1991 amendments to Title VII. However, this does not
detract from the importance of the role of tort law in this case. Once the Court
decided not to follow Price Waterhouse and the 1991 amendments to Title
VII, it was required to make a choice regarding what the causation standard
should be. The choice the Court makes-but-for cause-is largely driven by
the majority opinion's narrow view of tort law and by Gross, which also relied
on tort law. 3 3
Nassar invoked tort law from the beginning of the opinion, defining the
case as one involving causation and then noting that causation inquiries most
commonly arise in tort cases. 34 The majority engaged in a lengthy discussion
of causation's role in tort law, with numerous citations to the Restatement of
Torts and a torts treatise. 35
This increased use of tort law in discrimination coincided with the rise of
the "new textualist philosophy." 36 Although definitions of textualism vary, this
methodology defines the meaning of the statute by looking primarily at the
language of the statute, without considering certain types of legislative
history.37 This methodology heavily relies on the text of the statute and certain
28
29

Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1190-94 (2011).
1d at 1194.
30
1d at 1191.
31 Id; Davis v. Omni-Care, Inc., No. 10-3806, 2012 WL 1959367, at *7 (6th Cir. June
Jajeh v. Cnty. of Cook, 678 F.3d 560, 572 (7th Cir. 2012).
1, 2012);
32
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2523 (2013).
33
Id. at 2523-25.
34
Id at 2524.
35
Id at 2525.
36
Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1761-

62 (2010) (noting the rise of the "new textualist" philosophy in the 1980s); see generally T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20 (1988)

(describing various statutory interpretation techniques).
37

See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L.

REV. 70, 78 (2006) (noting that the dividing line between textualism and purposivism is not
"cut-and-dried"); Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REv. 347, 355 (2005)
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conventions for determining the meaning of language, such as dictionaries,
grammatical context, and other canons of construction. 38
Those espousing new textualist methods argue that the most appropriate
way to interpret a statute is to determine the meaning of the words used by the
legislature. 39 Congress is required to say what it means in statutory language.
Sources of meaning, such as legislative history, may not fully capture the
intent of a multi-member legislative body or the compromises reached to
ultimately pass a piece of legislation. For some pieces of legislation, finding a
single legislative intent may not be possible.
One main competing methodology of new textualism is intentionalism.
Judges using this methodology often use the text of a statute plus other indicia
of intent, such as legislative history, to determine what Congress intended. 4 0
The Supreme Court has used a textualist methodology in many
employment discrimination cases. 4 1 Both Gross and Nassar employ textualist
methods. 42 The majority opinion in both cases framed the primary issue as
determining the meaning of the words "because of."43 In doing so, the Court

(discussing the acknowledgement by textualists of the relevance of purpose in statutory
interpretation); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation,

61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 592-93 (1988) (commenting that a plain meaning analysis must
take into account both the internal context of the statute as well as the external context).
Further, there is strong disagreement regarding whether the courts are required to
determine the meaning of the statute at the time of its enactment or whether the meaning of
the statute can vary over time. See Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 21.
38 Gluck, supra note 36, at 1763.
39
See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REv. 419, 420
(2005).
40
The term "intentionalist" may be used to describe several different methods of
statutory construction that allow the use of legislative history and other signals of intent,
but these methods may differ significantly. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the
Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351,

366-68 (1994). Other

intentionalists countenance the use of legislative and other materials to determine the plain
meaning of the language in the first place. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 325-26

(1990). In this Article, the term "intentionalism" refers broadly to those methods of
statutory construction that countenance the use of some method of legislative intent. The
third way jurists commonly interpret statutes is by considering whether the broad purposes
of a statute support a particular interpretation. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S.
844, 861 (2005). For example, a court might look to the broad, remedial purposes of a
statutory regime to serve as a guide on whether to read a particular statutory provision
broadly or narrowly.
41See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History?, Playing the
Court/Congress/PresidentCivil Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613, 677-79 (1991)

(discussing textualism in civil rights cases).
42
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528-31 (2013); Gross v.
FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009).
43
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524-25; Gross, 557 U.S. at 176-77.
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added a new textualist canon to discrimination jurisprudence-unless
Congress directs otherwise, the default meaning of words is a tort meaning.44
In Nassar, the Court defined the interpretive question to. involve the
meaning of the words "because of," which the Court characterized as a causal
question. 4 5 The Court cited numerous sections from the Restatement of Torts
in support of its holding that Title VII's retaliation provision requires a
plaintiff to establish but-for cause. 46 It also cited a torts treatise. 47 Importantly,
the Court did not undertake an extensive review of the full meaning of the tort
concepts; nor did it explain why it is appropriate to apply causal principles
from negligence law to discrimination law. Nassar shows the interpretive
frame for analyzing discrimination statutes under the combined influences of
tortfication and textualism. This interpretive frame requires the court to find a
word in the discrimination statutes and then define that word as it would be
defined under the common law.
Gross provides a similar analysis. The Court framed the case as requiring
the Court to define the words "because of' in the ADEA. 48 The Court defined
the ADEA's causal language as requiring the plaintiff to establish but-for
cause. 49 It cited dictionaries and a torts treatise in support of this result.50
III. DISCRIMINATION STATUTES Do NOT REQUIRE INTENT-EVEN FOR
DISPARATE TREATMENT CLAIMS

The next three Sections address radical changes in discrimination law that
can happen if courts take the combined influences of tortification and
textualism seriously. When combined, these two concepts resolve a key
question in discrimination law: whether a plaintiff must establish intent to
prevail on an individual disparate treatment claim. Courts have repeatedly
asserted that disparate treatment claims are intentional. 5 1 Neither the ADEA

44 In other work, I have shown how this textual argument is not correct. See Sperino,
Tort Label, supra note 4, at 1053. Notably, Staub does not purport to be driven by
textualism, even though the opinion is written by Justice Scalia. Staub delineated USERRA

as an intentional tort and applied proximate cause ideas to the statute, but it never
connected these ideas with the language of the underlying statute. Staub v. Proctor Hosp.,
131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191-94 (2011).
45
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525-26.
46
1d at 2524-25.
47 Id.
48 Gross, 557 U.S. at 175-76.
49

1d. at 176.
1d. at 176-77.
51 See Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers,Accommodation,
50

and the Disaggregationof DiscriminatoryIntent, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 1357, 1368 (2009)

(noting that "[fjew propositions are less controversial or more embedded in the structure of
Title VII analysis than that the statute recognizes only 'disparate treatment' and 'disparate
impact' theories of employment discrimination.").
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nor Title VII use the term "intent" in its primary operative language. 52 Rather
an employer violates the statute when it takes certain employment actions
because of a protected trait. Numerous scholars have argued that this language
refers to causation, not intent.53 More than two decades ago, Professor
Oppenheimer laid the theoretical groundwork for a negligent discrimination
claim. 54 Although certain areas of discrimination law have aspects of
negligence law, the idea that a plaintiff could establish a disparate treatment
claim through a non-intent framework has not gained traction. 55
Staub reiterated that discrimination statutes are torts and that Congress
adopted discrimination statutes against a common law backdrop. 56 Gross and
Nassar defined "because of' language in the ADEA and the Title VII
retaliation provision to mean causation. Taken together, Gross, Staub, and
Nassar provide a textual argument that Title VII and the ADEA allow a
plaintiff to proceed on a disparate treatment claim without proving intent.
In both Gross and Nassar, the Supreme Court interpreted the "because of'
language in federal discrimination statutes to mean "but-for" cause. Both of
these cases hold that the "because of' language is causal language. 57 Tort law
uses intent language to describe intent and causal language (like factual cause
and legal cause) to discuss causation. If the discrimination statutes are torts, it
is strange to assume that Congress meant to conflate both causal language and
intent language in the words "because of." No other words in the main
operative language point toward intent.
, If Title VII and the ADEA are derived from the common law, then
Congress knew how to use intent-like words when defining the elements of a
claim. When the Restatement (Second) of Torts describes the elements of

battery, it uses the concept of intent. It indicates that "[a]n actor is subject to
liability to another for battery if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or
offensive contact with the person of the other . . . ."58 Likewise, the
Restatement uses intent language to describe other intentional torts, such as
52 When intent language is used in the statutes, it refers to affirmative defenses, or the
plaintiffs ability to obtain a jury trial or obtain certain types of remedies. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 a(a)(1) (2012) (stating that punitive and compensatory damages are available when a
plaintiff proves intentional discrimination).
53
See Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REv.
1431, 1475 (2012) (discussing scholarship); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent
Discrimination,141 U. PA. L. REv. 899, 916-17 (1993).
54
See generally Oppenheimer, supra note 53, at 916-17.
55
See, e.g., Aaron v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 3:08 CV 1471, 2009 WL 803586, at
*2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2009) ("He also alleges Defendant was merely 'negligent' in its
hiring practices, which does not rise to the standard of intentional discrimination required
by Title VII."); Jalal v. Columbia Univ., 4 F. Supp. 2d 224, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Title
VII, however, provides no remedy for negligent discrimination. . .
56
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191, 1194 (2011).
57
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2523 (2013); Gross v. FBL
Fin. Serys.,
Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
58
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965).
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assault and false imprisonment. 59 That Congress chose not to use this same
language in the primary operative language of the discrimination statutes, even
though, according to the Supreme Court, it was acting against the backdrop of
the common law, is telling. This argument is bolstered by the fact that
Congress did use the words "intended" and "intention" in other provisions of
Title VII. 60
The most textually compatible reading of the discrimination statutes is that
they do not require the plaintiff to prove intent, but that the plaintiff may
choose to try to make her case by showing intentional discrimination. This
interpretation of the discrimination statutes is also more consistent with
Supreme Court precedent. In 1971, the Supreme Court interpreted the original
operative language of Title VII as allowing a disparate impact claim, which
does not require a showing of intent. 6 1 Failure-to-accommodate cases, for
either religion or disability, do not require the plaintiff to establish that the
decisionmaker possessed any animus or intent. There is no textual impediment
to a non-intent-based claim outside the disparate impact and accommodation
contexts.
To read discrimination law as requiring intent, one has to read concepts
into the statutory language that are not included in the actual text. In Nassar,
the majority opinion indicated that the "desire to retaliate" must be the "butfor" cause of the action taken. 62 This articulation adds a step that is not
supported by a tort reading. If "because of' means causation, then the
employment action need only result from the fact of the protected trait, in that
if the person had another protected trait, the outcome would be different. In the
retaliation context this would mean the outcome would have been different if
the plaintiff had not engaged in the protected activity. While in many
instances, this result may happen because a bad actor harbors animus, animus
is not required. 63
In some cases, whether the plaintiff has to establish intent determines
whether the plaintiff will win or lose the case. Two examples help to illustrate
the types of cases where the replacement of causation with intent would make
a doctrinal difference. Before orchestras started using blind auditions, men
were disproportionately selected for certain positions, even though there was
no apparent animus or intent. 64 When orchestras started using blind auditions,

59 1d.
60

§§ 21, 35 (assault and false imprisonment).

E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2012).
61 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-33 (1971).
62
Nassar, 133 S.Ct. at 2521.
63 The Gross decision, for the most part, does not blur this line between causation and
intent. It holds that to prevail on a disparate-treatment claim, the plaintiff must establish
that age was the but-for cause of the employment action. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.,
557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009).
6 Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of
"Blind" Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REv. 715, 717-20 (2000).
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it increased the number of women chosen. 65 The non-blind selection procedure
was allowing the outcome of the selection process to be affected by sex, even
though it would be difficult for a plaintiff to prove that the orchestras intended
to do so. 66 Given the few orchestra positions available each year, it is very
unlikely that a plaintiff would be available to establish a disparate impact
claim.
A second example is when an employer makes salary decisions by giving
supervisors wide discretion in determining the amount of employees'
compensation. Assume that over time, most women who work for the
employer or who work in particular positions receive a lower salary than men
with similar credentials. The women cannot point to any particular animus or
intent that is causing this outcome. Given the difficulties of establishing a
disparate impact claim, it is important to know whether the female workers
could proceed under a disparate treatment framework without showing intent.
In both of these situations if "because of' means causation, the women
may be able to prevail on their claim, even though they cannot point to a bad
actor or establish intent. Their evidence could show that if they were men, they
would have received the position or been paid more. 67 Replacing an intent
standard with a causation standard makes it possible to prove cases of
unconscious or structural discrimination, without proceeding through a
disparate impact analysis.
This causation standard also allows us to conceptualize a separate form of
employer liability that does not rely on the intent of individual actors. The
federal discrimination statutes do not provide for individual liability. Rather,
the employer is the entity liable for discrimination. 68 Outside of pattern or
practice claims, the courts have had trouble transferring the concept of intent
to the entity context. Because traditional intent doctrines developed in the
context of individual liability, they are sometimes difficult to apply to entities.
With a causation standard, this difficulty diminishes. Wal-Mart v. Dukes
shows a factual scenario where the switch from intent to causation is critical. 69
In Dukes, the plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart provided a spectrum of possible
wages for employees in a particular position. 70 The plaintiffs' statistical
evidence suggested that women were, on average, paid on the lower end of the
pay spectrum.7 1 According to the plaintiffs' allegations, Wal-Mart provided
supervisors with wide discretion to make decisions about where to place
employees along the spectrum. 72 It is unlikely that the plaintiffs would be able
to establish that the entity Wal-Mart had animus or even "intent" as courts
65

d. at 716.
1d. at 716-17.
67 The statistical analysis might be complex.
68
See, e.g., Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993).
69
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547-48 (2011).
70
d. at 2563 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
7
66

1
Id.
72
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tend to characterize that concept in the discrimination context. However, the
plaintiffs may be able to establish that their sex made a difference in the
outcome. If all other reasons for paying a worker less are stripped away and
sex remains, the women could establish that sex caused the pay differential
under a disparate treatment theory.
IV. DISCRIMINATION'S INTENT STANDARD Is LESS ONEROUS

Some plaintiffs may want to proceed under an intentional discrimination
framework, even if the text of the discrimination statutes does not require them
to do so. Their evidence may fit better within an intent narrative, and they may
believe that juries and judges will find intentional discrimination claims more
sympathetic. Under Title VII, plaintiffs may want to obtain punitive or
compensatory damages, which are only available if the plaintiff proves
intentional discrimination. 73
The move to tort law is important for three different intent issues. First, if
we presume that courts should use tort law concepts to define intent then
discrimination plaintiffs alleging intentional conduct should not be required to
establish animus or mens rea. Second, tort law highlights how the courts have
been inexact in defining what they mean by intent and what consequences a
decisionmaker must intend. Third, using tort law opens the door for using the
concept of transferred intent in discrimination cases.
As discussed in the prior section, the discrimination statutes do not use the
term "intent" to define the cause of action. Rather, the courts have developed
this concept over time and sometimes refer to individual disparate treatment
cases as requiring the plaintiff to show intent. Surprisingly, there is no
Supreme Court case that expressly defines the intent required to prove
discrimination. The cases that address intent provide a varied view of the
requirement. Some cases appear to impose a heightened form of intent that is
akin to animus or mens rea.74 Staub itself discusses the term "animus," but this
is largely due to the fact that the plaintiff had evidence of animus. 75 Staub does
not impose an animus requirement, but rather, it recognizes that the plaintiff
may proceed using an animus construct. 76
Tort law makes it clear that the minimum standard for intentional tort
culpability is not animus. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines intent as
requiring that the actor desires the consequences of his action or "believes that
the consequences are substantially certain to result from [the action]."77 If
courts are required to presume that Congress was legislating against a common
7342 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2012).
74
See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 637 (2007)
(using the term."animus"); Stephen M. Rich, Against Prejudice,80 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1,
7 (2011) (arguing that recent cases move away from an animus-based notion).
75 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011).
76RcS

77 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
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law backdrop, then the courts should assume that the standard tort definition of
intent applies in discrimination cases. Although some torts require a higher
level of intent, it would be strange to presume that these less common
meanings applied, without any explicit indication in the statutory language.
Since the federal discrimination statutes do not even mention intent in their
primary operative language, it is unlikely that Congress intended the further
step of rejecting the traditional intent concept in favor of a higher animus
standard. 78
The Restatement's intent standard is two-pronged, allowing the plaintiff to
prevail by establishing either definition of intent. 79 Adding the substantial
certainty test to discrimination law would be an important innovation. For
example, consider an employer that has data showing that its employment
practices result in a disparity based on sex. Perhaps the employer has
knowledge that it uses subjective pay criteria and when supervisors use
subjectivity that women are paid less than men. Future continued use of these
subjective criteria would meet the substantial certainty intent standard. The
employer would know that the outcome of its employment practice was
substantially certain to result in pay differentials because of sex.
Defining intent in the discrimination statutes in this way will help the
courts to see a way in which they have not been careful about conceptualizing
intent. Currently, the case law is unclear about whether the discriminatory
actor must intend the differential outcome or whether the person only has to
intend the employment action.
An example is helpful in understanding the problem. Assume a situation in
which a supervisor is making decisions about how much to pay two employees
within a defined spectrum of potential pay. Without consciously thinking
about it too much, the supervisor decides to pay the woman $10 an hour and
the man $11 an hour. The supervisor is not consciously thinking about paying
women less than men and would deny any animus or intent in a deposition.
Assume the record would also show that an objective view of both employee's
work histories and performance do not justify the pay differential.
In this scenario, the critical question is whether intent requires the
decisionmaker to consciously take sex into account or to intend the differential
outcome. If so, a woman would not be able to establish a discrimination claim.
However, if the construct requires that the supervisor merely intend the pay
decisions and that those decisions result in a pay differential tied to sex, then a
plaintiff can prevail on an intentional discrimination claim.
78 The move to tort law opens an interesting interpretive question under Title VII. In
1991, Congress amended Title VII to allow a plaintiff to prevail if she is able to show a
protected trait was a "motivating factor" in an employment action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
(2012). It is unclear whether this standard is merely a causal standard, or, if in mixedmotive cases Congress meant to impose a higher "motive" requirement. See Staub, 131
S. Ct. at 1195-96 (Alito, J., concurring).
79
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
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This second understanding of intent is consistent with how intent is
conceived in trespass cases. In a trespass case, the tortfeasor is not required to
know that he is physically present on the land of another to commit the
intentional tort of trespass. 80 The violation of the possessory interest of another
does not require the knowledge that the interest is being violated. Using tort
law to define intent shows how courts have not been careful in defining what a
wrongdoer needs to intend to create liability under the discrimination statutes.
Not only does tort law diminish the intent required in discrimination cases,
it also allows the use of transferred intent. Intentional torts embrace the idea of
transferred intent. For example, in assault cases, the intent required is to place
someone in apprehension of a bodily contact.8 1 The Restatement (Second) of
Torts provides examples of transferred intent. One of the illustrations is of a
person, person C, who is intentionally aiming a gun at another person, person
B. 82 At that moment, person A comes from behind a tree and sees the gun
pointed in his direction. 83 C faces liability to A in this instance, even though
the intent is originally against B, not A. 84 This same idea could be used to
expand the potential plaintiffs in discrimination cases.
Consider the following example. Let's assume that a supervisor sexually
harasses Molly. The evidence establishes that all of his actions are focused on
Molly and for the purposes of the hypothetical, let's assume that the evidence
will establish that the supervisor did not mean to sexually harass any other
women. Nonetheless, Paula, another woman in the workplace, witnesses the
harassment and reasonably believes that her opportunities in the workplace are
limited or reasonably believes that witnessing the actions changes the terms or
conditions of her work. Under a tort theory of intent, Paula could establish
intent in this situation.
Relying on tort law should radically change how courts describe and think
about intent in discrimination cases. It should lower the intent standard, open
the possibility for liability when the employer is substantially certain a result
will occur, show instances where the courts have been inexact in describing
the required nexus between intent and the negative outcome, and provide for
transferred intent as a viable theory of recovery.
V. THE HARM THRESHOLD IS LOWER
If the discrimination statutes are torts, the courts must recalibrate the harm
threshold for both harassment cases and for determining when an adverse
employment action occurs.

80

Id § 158.

81

Id § 32.

82
1d
83
1d.
8

4Id.

§ 32 cmt. b, illus. 3.
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Some harassment cases involve physical touching or imminent, threatened
touching.8 5 Tort law categorizes this conduct as battery or assault. 86 Despite
this strong connection with tort law, court interpretation of the discrimination
statutes sometimes imposes more onerous requirements than those imposed for
battery and assault.
In 1986, the Supreme Court officially recognized harassment as a type of
discrimination in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.87 In that case the plaintiff

alleged that her supervisor fondled and raped her, so harassment doctrine
originally developed in the context of battery and assault.88 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court imposed requirements on plaintiffs that are sometimes more
onerous than under tort law.
To be actionable a hostile work environment must affect the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment. 89 In interpreting when harassment
would rise to this level, the Court held that it must be "sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment. . . ."9o In 1993,
the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff alleging harassment need not allege
psychological injury, but would be required to establish that she subjectively
believed the environment to be hostile or abusive and that the environment
would be so viewed by an objective person. 9 1 In making this latter inquiry, the
Court noted:
But we can say that whether an environment is "hostile" or "abusive" can be
determined only by looking at all the circumstances. These may include the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
whether it
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
92
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.

85

See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986); Hockman v.
Westward Commc'ns, LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 328 (5th Cir. 2004); Shepherd v. Comptroller of
Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 872-75 (5th Cir. 1999); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993).
86
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 18, 21 (1965).
87
MeritorSay. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72.
88Id. at 60.
89
d. at 67.
90

Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993).
91
92
d. at 23. Although there are some variations, courts tend to articulate a harassment
claim as requiring proof that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, that she was
subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, that the harassment was based on sex, and that
it affected a term, condition or privilege of employment. See, e.g., Sandoval v. Am. Bldg.
Maint. Indus., Inc., 578 F.3d 787, 801 (8th Cir. 2009). The fourth element contains both
objective and subjective components, requiring the harassment to be "severe or pervasive
enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment," as well as requiring
the victim to subjectively perceive the working conditions to be so altered. Id. (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Under tort law, the invasion of a person's physical space in a harmful or
offensive way or the imminent threat of such invasion is enough to establish
the tort.93 This is not the case with harassment law, where the plaintiff must
establish that she perceived the conduct to be severe or pervasive enough to
affect her work and that an objective, reasonable person would also perceive
the conduct that way. 94 These requirements have led to absurd results. Courts
have declared that the following conduct does not constitute harassment as a
matter of law: kissing, slapping a worker on the behind with a newspaper,
brushing up against a plaintiffs breast and behind, rubbing the plaintiffs arm
from shoulder to wrist, and attempting to touch the plaintiff on numerous
occasions. 95
I
If discrimination statutes are torts, then physical invasions should be
treated with the same level of respect with which physical invasions are treated
under tort law. The plaintiff should not be required to show repeated
inappropriate touching or especially extreme inappropriate touching to prove
her claim. Rather, if discrimination is a tort, discrimination law should
recognize that intrusions upon physical dignity constitute cognizable harm.
Invasions or threatened invasions of this interest should result in liability
without repeated or especially egregious conduct.
Embracing textualism and tortification can also expand how the courts
perceive remedies. For most torts, tort law separates the idea of injury from
damages. In a trespass case, a defendant is liable for invading the possessory
interest of another, even if he does not harm a single blade of grass on the
plaintiffs property. 96 Likewise, a person commits a battery simply by poking
another person with his pinkie finger in an offensive way, even if no physical
harm results. 97 In both of these cases, the harm happens when the interest is
violated.98
This dichotomy between injury and damages typically is not an issue in
discrimination cases because the plaintiff often has proof of monetary or
emotional harm. In most cases, the idea of injury and compensable damages
does not need to be separated. But, in some cases, the dichotomy is critically
important.
All courts will recognize a cause of action when an employer takes an
action that is explicitly prohibited by the federal discrimination statutes, such
as termination or failure to hire. Some federal courts refuse to allow a plaintiff
93 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 18, 21 (1965).

94
Harris,510
95

U.S. at 21-23.
See, e.g., Hockman v. Westward Commc'ns, LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 328 (5th Cir.
2004); Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 872-75 (5th Cir. 1999);
Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993).
96
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163 (1965).
97
1d. § 18.
98
Id. §§ 18, 163. Negligence incorporates damages as part of the elements of the
plaintiffs claim. See, e.g., Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 914 N.E.2d 891, 898-99
(Mass. 2009).
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to proceed on a discrimination claim if the courts do not deem her harm to be
serious enough. 99 The courts call this concept "adverse employment action" or
"ultimate employment action."1 00
There is no consensus on the required level of harm, and one court noted
that "[d]ivergent authority, nationwide, obscures the parameters of adverse
employment action."101 Some courts have held that criticism or counseling do
not constitute an adverse employment action.102 Some courts hold that
negative evaluations are not serious enough to result in liability. 10 3 In other
words, even if a plaintiff proves that her supervisor gave her a bad evaluation
based on her sex or race, the plaintiff cannot prevail on a discrimination claim
in courts with a higher harm threshold.
This result does not follow from either textualism or most tort law. Title
VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against "any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment"
and also prohibits the employer from limiting employees in any way that
"would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee." 04 Getting negative
evaluations affects an employee's "terms or conditions" of employment and
also deprives or tends to deprive the person of employment opportunities or
otherwise affects her status.
Other than imposing a de minimis threshold, most torts do not define the
minimal level of harm that must occur to establish a violation. Once the
interest is violated, the plaintiff can legally establish the claim without proving
additional harm. If discrimination law is like most torts, then once the

99
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 60-61 (2006) (discussing
adverse action requirement in discrimination and retaliation cases).
100 Id
101 Nelson v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 923 F. Supp. 275, 281 (D. Me. 1996).
102Id. at 281-82 (applying adverse employment action concept to Title IX retaliation
claim but claiming to use Title VII standards); Fausto v. Welch, No. 89-1542-WF, 1994
WL 568846, at *7 (D. Mass. Oct. 12, 1994) ("Disparaging remarks can, under proper
circumstances, constitute an adverse employment action [under Title VII]. To do so,
however, such disparaging comments must significantly impair the employee's ability to
function in his position."); see also Simmerman v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A.
94-6906, 1996 WL 131948, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 1996) (criticism is not adverse
employment action under the ADA); Lefevre v. Design Prof 1 Ins. Cos., No. C-93-20720
RPA, 1994 WL 544430, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 1994) (harsh criticism of an
employee's work does not constitute adverse employment action).
103 See, e.g., Sotomayor v. City of N.Y., 862 F. Supp. 2d 226, 254 (E.D.N.Y. 2012),
aff'd, 713 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2013); Taylor v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 11 -CV-3582,
2012 WL 5989874, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012) (being rated as having unsatisfactory
performance not sufficient to constitute an adverse action); Siddiqi v. N.Y.C. Health &
Hosps. Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 353, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Johnson v. Frank, 828 F. Supp.
1143, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (rating of "unacceptable" at mid-year review not an adverse
employment action).
104 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
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employer violates the underlying interest, the plaintiff should be able to prevail
on a claim, unless the statute provides otherwise.
VI. TORT COMMON LAW IS BOTH MEANING AND METHOD
Together, tortification and textualism can radically alter substantive
discrimination law. But tortification poses a bigger challenge to the very
meaning of textualism. Tort law is a set of substantive, doctrinal choices.
Those choices are paired with a common law methodology in approaching
problems. If employment discrimination is a tort, does it retain both the
substantive content of tort words and its underlying methodology?
Recent Supreme Court cases claim that discrimination law is a tort and
that Congress intended that the statutes' words be interpreted against the
backdrop of tort law. 105 Unless otherwise indicated, the Court is required to
look to tort law to define statutory terms. Implicit within this statement is the
idea that Congress understood what the common law of torts was and how it
would interact with the statute it was passing. One fundamental aspect of tort
law is that it was created using a common law methodology, where the
meaning of words and concepts develop over time and respond to changed
circumstances. In other words, common law torts maintain some flexibility to
change over time.
This flexibility raises important questions about what textualism means if
Congress intended to import common law tort concepts into a statutory
regime. There are at least three possible answers to these questions. First,
when Congress enacted the discrimination statutes, it could have intended to
adopt current tort principles, along with their underlying common law
methodology. Under this approach, Congress intended the language in the
statute to develop over time, just as tort law does. Second, Congress could
have intended to adopt common law words, but to only allow discrimination
law to change in the future if tort common law changed. The third, and least
plausible, argument is that Congress intended to enshrine a particular
substantive tort meaning that becomes frozen within the statute, even though
tort law changes over time. In other words, it is unlikely that Congress
intended to reject a major tenet of tort law (its methodology) without an
express indication that it was doing so.
One basic feature of the common law is the way that it can change in
response to changed circumstances. The common law largely remains stable
over time given judicial commitment to stare decisis, but there are moments
when the common law changes drastically. When traditional notions of
causation and proof did not work for modern problems, courts changed the
common law to account for the changing factual landscape.106 Some examples
105 See supra Part II.
106 See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916)
(discarding privity requirements for certain injury claims involving defective products).
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of this include the separation of factual cause and proximate cause concepts,
the recognition of comparative negligence, and the development of products
liability law and concomitant abolition of privity concepts.
However, current popular models for interpreting statutes rely on notions
of legislative intent and textualism, both of which are difficult to marry with
common law methodology, unless one subscribes to forms of dynamic
statutory interpretation. 0 7 This problem is amplified by the ways the courts
approach stare decisis with regard to statutes, adopting an especially strong
presumption against overruling prior interpretations of statutes. 10 8
Given that a central feature of the common law is its occasional elasticity,
a fair argument flowing from the tortification of discrimination law is that
Congress also intended the courts to have the flexibility to engage the statutory
language and to adjust its contours over time in response to changing
circumstances. While thus far the tortification of discrimination law has led to
increasingly pro-employer interpretations of the statutes, this one feature of
tortification provides an opportunity for courts to allow the discrimination
statutes to respond to modem understandings about the ways people are
treated differently because of protected traits.
In other words, if Congress thought discrimination law was a tort, this
intent expressed two separate ideas: (1) read the statutes initially to be in
tandem with tort principles and (2) maintain flexibility within the law to deal
with changed circumstances, as tort law does. This second idea is a powerful
challenge to modem statutory interpretation, especially textualism. It also is a
challenge to the idea of "super stare decisis" in the statutory context.
When common law definitions are applied to statutes without using a
common law methodology, there is a risk that the definitions become
inflexible, even if this result would not obtain under the common law. This is
because the courts tend to view statutory words as having one fixed meaning
that does not change over time. Imagine for a second a world in which there
were common law causes of action for employment discrimination. Given the
flexibility of the common law methodology, one would expect the meaning of
its central elements to change over time, even if the common law tort retained
its central structure and language.109 If discrimination law is truly a tort, it
107See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U.

PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987).

108 See Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO.

WASH. L. REv. 317, 327-28 (2005) ("A majority of the circuits has explicitly adopted the
super-strong presumption against overruling statutory precedents, and in those circuits that
have never explicitly applied the rule, separate opinions assume that it applies.") (footnotes
omitted); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361,

1362 (1988) (discussing "super-strong" statutory stare decisis in the Supreme Court).
109
For an example of this phenomenon in the torts context, see MARTHA CHAMALLAS
& JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 132-

133 (2010) (discussing how courts used but-for causation standard in wrongful birth cases
but reframed the inquiry over time to allow plaintiffs to proceed on claims).
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should retain the flexibility to adapt to changed circumstances over time,
including new understandings of how discrimination occurs.
Another possibility is that Congress intended for the discrimination
statutes to be read initially in tandem with tort principles and that the statutes
should remain in tandem with tort principles over time. This claim is also in
tension with modem statutory interpretations that purport to identify one
meaning of a term within a statute and then provide that meaning with an
especially robust precedential effect.
The Supreme Court has implicitly adopted this kind of reasoning, that the
discrimination statutes should keep pace with modem understandings of tort
law. Nassar provides a good example. The Restatement (First) of Torts

considered proximate cause and factual cause to be a singular concept.1 1 0 In
negligence cases, a defendant's actions were a legal cause of harm if they were
"a substantial factor in bringing about the harm."1 ' The Restatement (Second)
of Torts retains a similar unitary concept.11 2 It is not until after the enactment
of both Title VII and the ADEA that the ideas of proximate cause and factual
cause are defined separately in the Restatement." 3
As discussed earlier, Nassar held that the words "because of' in Title
VII's retaliation provision mean that the plaintiff must establish protected
activity was a but-for cause of an adverse action. 114 However, this holding
does not reflect the Restatement published at the time of the statute's
enactment. If it did, legal cause under the retaliation provision would have
been a substantial factor test, conflating what a modem lawyer would separate
into legal and factual cause. Instead, Nassar explicitly relied on definitions of
tort concepts that were not formalized in the Restatement until after Congress
enacted the relevant statute.115
This interpretive move has big implications for statutory interpretation
principles. Congress's intent, as expressed in textual language, can be an intent
for a word to change meanings over time. The "super stare decisis" principle
cannot hold for words that the courts declare as deriving from the common
law.
110 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 430 (1934) (indicating that to establish legal
cause the plaintiff must be in the class of persons to which the defendant's actions create a
risk of causing harm); id. § 431 (defining legal cause as being a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm, without an exception to relieve the defendant of responsibility);
id. § 433 (defining legal cause with concepts such as whether there was a continuous force
or series of forces and whether the harm was highly extraordinary given the defendant's
conduct).
§ 431.
I1 IIId.
12
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
'13 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26
cmt. a14(2010) (recounting historical development).
1 See supra Part II.
115
See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 (2010);
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 265

(5th ed. 1984)).
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The third option-that Congress intended to enshrine a specific tort
meaning at the time of enactment and for that meaning to be entrenched even
as the common law changed-is the least plausible. As noted above, the
Supreme Court does not appear to be trying to divine common law tort
meanings from the time of each statute's enactment. This third option also
requires the belief that Congress meant to adopt the common law of torts
without one of its primary features: its ability to change over time.
It also creates the problem that over time the statutes will enshrine old
versions of the common law, even as the courts modify the underlying tort law
over time in light of changed circumstances. The statutes then become out of
sync with the very concepts Congress was trying to enshrine. A further
difficulty is added by statutory amendments. When Congress amends a statute,
is it meaning to bring the entire statute in line with current common law or
only revised portions of the statutes?
One response to this argument could be that by making a statutory tort,
Congress intended to divest concepts of their evolving nature. It is difficult to
determine what Congress understood with respect to Title VII and the ADEA
because modem statutory interpretation was not used in 1964 and 1967 when
Congress passed Title VII and the ADEA. More importantly, in Gross and
Nassar, the Supreme Court held that if Congress wanted to contradict the
common law, it was required to do so expressly.' 16 If Congress wanted to
reject a core feature of the common law-its ability to change over time-it is
fair to require Congress to articulate that desire.

VII. CONCLUSION
The move to tortify discrimination law is not supported by the history,
text, or purpose of the federal discrimination statutes. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court is strongly imbuing discrimination law with a tort conception
and meaning. It also is increasingly viewing these statutes through the
interpretive device of textualism. Given these moves, it is necessary to
consider what tortification and textualism mean for the discrimination statutes.
This Article demonstrates that both of these arguments can be used to broaden
the scope of discrimination law. They also radically challenge current ideas
about statutory interpretation and the fixed meaning of statutory terms.

1

6See id. at 2529; Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 173-75 (2009).

